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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that institutional investors may have a positive effect on stock
prices. This effect realizes through different mechanisms: institutional investors
reduce information asymmetries between firms and (other) investors, contribute to
the liquidity of the company’s stock and improve its corporate governance. We con-
jecture that firms, understanding the benefits of having institutional investors in
their ownership, may do efforts to attract them. We apply this idea in the context
of IPOs. Using data on Belgian IPOs over the period 1984-2000, we find that firms
using the stock market as a financing vehicle and firms less likely to be monitored
by corporate blockholders are more likely to pre-allocate shares to institutional
investors at IPO-time. Finally, pre-allocating shares to institutional investors is
shown to reduce underpricing and enhance post-IPO liquidity.
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Institutional investors – such as investment companies, mutual funds,
brokerages, insurance companies, pension funds, investment banks
and endowment funds – are entities with large amounts to invest.
While these investors have been prominently present in Anglo-Saxon
countries since a long time, we provide evidence that their importance
in Continental Europe has increased dramatically, especially since the
second half of the nineties. Specifically, we show an upsurge in the
amount of funds that they manage since 1991, which becomes espe-
cially striking as of 1995. Simultaneously, institutional investors in
Continental Europe on average exhibit a larger appetite for invest-
ments in the equity of listed companies during the second half of
the nineties.
Different studies have investigated the impact of having institu-
tional investors involved in a company’s ownership. Usually, institu-
tional investors are considered to have a positive effect on the stock
prices of the firms in which they invest. This effect materializes
through different mechanisms: institutional investors reduce infor-
mation asymmetries between the firm and (other) investors, con-
tribute to the liquidity of the company’s stock and improve the firm’s
corporate governance. Nevertheless, the literature has pointed out that
some new problems may arise after involving institutional investors
in a company’s ownership, such as larger variability in stock prices.
Also, specific conflicts of interest may arise between the firm and
small shareholders on the one hand and institutional investors on the
other.
If firms fully understand the positive influences of institutional
investors and if benefits are larger than costs, they may do efforts to
involve these professional investors in their ownership. In particular,
firms that can benefit from the functions performed by institutional
investors may wish to attract institutional interest. We apply these
ideas in the context of going public, using data on a sample of Bel-
gian initial public offerings (IPOs).1 The reason why we focus on IPOs
is that at the time firms go public, information asymmetries generally
are large (the firm has not yet built up a public track record), the liq-
uidity of the firm’s stock has to be assured in order to establish the
firm’s credibility (leave a good taste in investors’mouths) and gover-
nance structures usually have to be adjusted to take into account the
new (public) ownership structure of the firm. Our results show that
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pre-allocate shares to institutional investors at IPO-time. Such pre-
allocation is found to reduce underpricing and enhance post-IPO stock
liquidity. On the score of corporate governance, we find that firms
that are less likely to be monitored by corporate blockholders are more
inclined to pre-allocate shares to professionals, who are potential
active monitors. As pre-allocating companies have relatively fewer
outside directors in their board, we cannot conclude from our results
that institutional investors actually contribute to firm monitoring and
governance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II dis-
cusses the importance of institutional investors in financial markets.
The contribution of institutional investors to reducing information
asymmetries, increasing stock liquidity and improving governance is
treated in Section III. Section IV presents the results of our own study
on the role of institutional investors in IPOs. Finally, Section V con-
cludes this paper.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
The amount of financial resources under the control of institutional
investors and their investment in the equity of listed firms is rising in
all OECD-countries. Table 1 shows the evolution for Belgium and the
G-7 countries over the period 1991-2001. Data were obtained from the
OECD statistical yearbook on institutional investors. For every coun-
try and year, two pieces of information are reported: the market value
of total assets under institutional management as a percentage of the
country’s GDP (= Assets/GDP) and the value of assets invested in the
stock market as a percentage of total institutional assets (= Shares/
Assets).
Looking first at the importance of their assets relative to GDP, it is
clear that institutional investors as a group manage very important
amounts of capital, ranging from a capital stock equal to 81% of GDP
in Germany to 191% in the U.S. and the U.K. in 2001. In fact, in most
Anglo-Saxon countries institutional investors hold a significant posi-
tion, mainly because of the pension system: instead of paying pen-
sions through repartition as in Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and
Japan, where the active population generates the pensions of the retired
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a capitalization system, with individuals save for their own pensions.
In practice, the financial reserves that are produced this way are man-
aged by professional investors. Nevertheless, Table 1 shows that over
the studied window, Continental European countries have invested
very heavily in financial assets under management of institutional
investors. In these countries, the global growth rate of institutional
Assets/GDP-ratio is huge and ranges between 134% (France) and
356% (Italy).
Not only are the assets under the management of institutionals more
important in the U.S. and the U.K., also the fraction of total assets
invested in the stock market is significantly larger. Specifically, Table 1
shows that especially U.K. institutionals are very much share capital-
minded and invest around 65% of their resources in the stock market
over the considered window. With an average of about 40%, stock
market investments are a major part of professional portfolios in the
U.S. too. Parallel to the growth in importance, in Continental Euro-
pean countries the portion of assets invested in equity also rises over
time. In fact for Belgium and France, this portion attains a level sim-
ilar to the one in the U.S. in 2001. Probably, the stock market boom
during the second half of the nineties has played an important role in
the increasing importance of institutional holdings and the shift
towards equity investments. In fact, the high returns produced by
shares (and the low interest rates) over that period made it particularly
attractive for institutionals to invest higher portions in stock rather
than in traditional interest-bearing securities. The resulting influx of
capital in the stock market, next to increasing stock prices even more,
obviously created opportunities for firms wishing to enter the stock
market through an IPO.
In view of the combination of rising weight in the economy and
increasing appetite for shares, institutionals have become an increas-
ingly important investor group in the stock market, especially in Con-
tinental Europe. As these investors have demands, behavior and inter-
ests different from small individual shareholders, this phenomenon is
likely to affect publicly quoted firms and stock markets in general. In
Section III, we survey three important aspects of institutional investor
behavior and investigate the consequences for firms. These aspects
concern professional information collection, the demand for and the
contribution to liquidity and the more important bargaining power of





Importance and investments of institutional investors
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Belgium
Assets/GDP 44.6 47.4 57.3 55.5 57.9 64.3 73 88.1 101 106.1 109
Shares/Assets 19.59 18.69 19.93 21.73 21.68 22.96 26.68 31.52 37.6 41.39 40.9
France
Assets/GDP 56.4 61.9 73.9 71.7 77.7 86.6 97 106.9 124.2 131.8 131.8
Shares/Assets 9.02 7.96 6.69 6.9 23.31 25.03 29.68 34.26 42.03 45.64 42.89
Italy
Assets/GDP 20.6 21.8 28.2 32.2 32 39 53.9 79.6 99.5 97.8 94
Shares/Assets 10.26 8.87 10.9 14.96 14.14 12.07 14.06 15.28 22.37 23.02 18.13
Germany
Assets/GDP 33.9 34 38.9 41.3 45.3 50.6 58.8 66.3 76.9 79.8 81
Shares/Assets 9.57 10.24 12.46 12.22 12.23 13.99 18.61 21.79 27.91 28.01 24.43
Japan
Assets/GDP 73.3 77.7 83 81.5 88.6 88.4 86.7 89.6 98.9 97.7 94.7
Shares/Assets 23.91 21.66 21.73 18.26 19.13 16.8 15.31 15.35 18.78 17.05 15.736
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4 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Canada
Assets/GDP 64.2 69.6 79.4 81.7 84.2 93.2 101.4 110.1 111.5 113.7 115.8
Shares/Assets 22.18 22.68 22.97 23.97 25.51 26.52 27.83 27.6 26.88 26.9 25.12
U.K.
Assets/GDP 116.3 130.7 162.2 143 162.8 172 194.1 202 227.7 212.8 190.9
Shares/Assets 69.53 68.3 69.73 68.51 68.37 67.24 67.99 64.98 66.59 65.48 64.92
U.S.
Assets/GDP 124.2 127.2 136.3 135.9 151.8 162.9 178.4 192 207.8 198.7 191
Shares/Assets 28.91 30.34 33 33.49 38.41 42.13 46.19 48.19 51.3 48.81 44.11III. THE FUNCTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN
CORPORATE FINANCE
In this section, we discuss the role of institutional investors in reduc-
ing information asymmetries, increasing liquidity, and improving cor-
porate governance.
A. Institutional investors and information asymmetries
Since the seminal work by Akerlof (1970), it is well known that asym-
metric information leads to price discounts. Using the example of the
used car market, Akerlof shows that rational buyers understand that
they are up against sellers that are better informed about the intrinsic
quality of the cars put up for sale. As a result, they will only offer to
buy at prices reflecting the fact that lower quality owners are most
likely to be the ones that are prepared to sell. If asymmetric informa-
tion is important, the discount may become so large that good quality
sellers are driven out of the market and only the lowest quality own-
ers remain willing to trade.
Adverse selection through asymmetric information is also a well-
known phenomenon in financial markets. When stock prices are low,
managers and company insiders often complain that their firm cannot
issue new shares to finance its investments because the market can-
not be convinced that it underestimates the true value of the firm. Con-
vincing the market is not easy, because outside investors understand
that they are up against better informed agents that have an interest in
claiming that the share price is too low, even if this is not the case.
Hence overall, information asymmetries tend to have a negative
impact on the stock price of better quality firms. Consequently, firms
may invest in reducing information asymmetries to increase their stock
prices.
Different theoretical models show how this may actually arise.
These models generally assign a role to institutional investors. Dia-
mond and Verrecchia (1991) start out from the logic that a reduction
in information asymmetries lowers the cost of capital and that com-
panies that can benefit most will invest more strongly in reducing such
asymmetries. In their model, the decline in the cost of capital is caused
by the fact that better information attracts more large investors (such
as institutional owners) as less information asymmetries enhance
every-day liquidity. Clearly, the problem of information asymmetry
695and liquidity – which is discussed in Section III.B. hereafter – are
closely interrelated. Similarly, in a capital market with incomplete
information, Merton (1987) shows that stock prices are higher the
larger the number of investors aware of the company’s securities. This
view could explain why larger, hence most of the time also better-
known firms attract more investors and institutionals in particular.
The preceding views are supported by empirical evidence. Consis-
tent with the notion that fewer information asymmetries are associated
with the presence of more institutional owners, Grullon et al. (2004)
find that firms that invest in increased visibility attract more investors,
and especially institutional owners. This practice results in more
liquidity and higher stock prices. Interestingly, their findings also
reveal that visibility may be enhanced not only by investing directly
in investor relations, but also by product market advertising. Bushee
and Noe (2000) find that firms ranking higher in the disclosure
rankings2 have more institutional ownership. Consistent with the view
that attracting more investors in general enhances prices, Kadlec and
McConnell (1994) find that when companies listed elsewhere
announce their decision to also list in New York, their stock on average
yields a positive abnormal return.
A quickly developing area of research linking reduced information
asymmetries and institutional investors concerns bookbuilding. Book-
building is a method through which the selling price of a large block
of shares is determined. Originally developed in the U.S., the method
has been extensively used in Continental Europe since the mid-nineties
for the marketing of shares in IPOs. In essence, it involves asking pro-
fessional investors how many shares they are willing to buy and at
what price. On the basis of this information, the firm and its invest-
ment bankers determine the IPO’s offering price. The method uses the
fact that compared to small retail investors, professionals generally
are better able to evaluate the true worth of a firm. Cohen et al. (2002)
find empirical support for this conjecture. Their evidence indicates
that institutional investors are capable of better evaluating the infor-
mational content of cash flow news as compared to retail investors.
So, in contrast to the earlier discussed studies of Diamond and
Verrecchia (1991) and Merton (1987), where institutional investors
benefit from reduced information asymmetries and enhanced liquidity,
this stream in the literature posits that institutional investors – via the
bookbuilding procedure – actually contribute to decreasing information
asymmetries, thereby adding to the stock’s value and liquidity.
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the first stage the offering price is determined as described above, and
in a second stage retail investors are allowed to subscribe at the price
determined in the first stage.3 As this subscription price reflects
the value professionals are willing to pay, it should reduce the thresh-
old to subscribe for small investors. However, for bookbuilding to
work in practice, the IPO-firm needs to give professional investors an
incentive to invest in information collection and then truthfully reveal
their opinion. This is typically achieved by reducing the subscription
price below the true worth of the firm as revealed by the bookbuild-
ing. Subscribers then achieve a positive return as compared to buying
on the first day of normal trading on the exchange (in most countries,
this return to ‘underpricing’amounts to 15% on average).4 Because of
this reduction in price, investors usually ask more shares than are sup-
plied by the firm so that rationing has to take place. Classically, the
institutional investors that bade the highest price during the book-
building phase are less rationed. This logic has been developed in
detail in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm
(1990), Welch (1991), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001). It is also sup-
ported empirically. Indeed, as predicted by these models, institutional
investors collect valuable information and prove to be able to outper-
form small investors at the time of an IPO (Aggarwal et al. (2002)).
Furthermore, when allocation rules change and the benefits of partic-
ipating are reduced, these professionals collect less information
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002); Keloharju and Torstila (2002)).
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) also show that overall the indirect
issuance costs caused by underpricing are reduced through the process
of bookbuilding and hence benefit IPO-firms.
Preceding findings imply that through the presence of institution-
als in the market, selling methods of shares can be developed that
ease capital market access for firms that face important information
asymmetries, i.e. hard to value stocks, like young high-growth firms.
Arosio et al. (2001) and Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2002) indeed
find that since the introduction of bookbuilding in Continental Europe
in the second half of the nineties, young high-tech firms with large
financing needs dominate the population of firms going public. By
using bookbuilding, organizing roadshows abroad and involving high-
reputation foreign investment banks in the marketing process, these
IPO-firms have succeeded in placing a fraction of their shares with
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors also. However, notwithstanding
697its merits, the method has been a source of conflicts of interest
between firms and small shareholders on the one hand and the advis-
ing investment bankers and professional investors on the other hand.
Specifically, Aggarwal et al. (2002) show for IPOs in the U.S. that
investment bankers reward their good institutional clients with deeply
underpriced issues, significantly in excess of what could be explained
by a mere remuneration for the service of information gathering. In
response, investment bankers argue that institutional investors are
assigned shares on the basis of more criteria than only their effort in
information gathering. One important additional service that these
professionals may offer to the investment banker is the promise not
to immediately sell shares in the aftermarket, or even buy shares if
selling pressure would occur shortly after the IPO. In Continental
Europe, this conflict of interest may be even more serious as many
institutional investors are subsidiaries of financial institutions that
render investment banking services. Consistent with this idea, Hebb
and MacKinnon (2004) find that greater information asymmetry is
present in the aftermarket when a commercial bank acts as under-
writer in an IPO. This asymmetry resolves itself over time as the mar-
ket learns more about each issue so that it becomes clear which ones
may have involved a conflict of interest on the part of the commer-
cial bank. These findings thus are consistent with the market perceiv-
ing a possible conflict of interest on the part of commercial banks.
B. Institutional investors and liquidity
Liquidity, i.e. the ease with which an asset can be converted into cash
– and especially the lack of it – affects value. The reason why a defi-
ciency in liquidity negatively affects the price of shares is threefold.
First of all, if a stock is not regularly traded (in the limit not traded),
uncertainty about its underlying value increases (Merton (1987)). For
one of the important properties of a stock market is that, as investors
assemble information and act upon it, the information becomes
reflected into the stock price. Hence the less trading, the less oppor-
tunity for information to be (timely) incorporated into the price, and
the more uncertainty about the stock’s underlying value. Furthermore,
as liquidity decreases, fewer investors are interested in the stock, so
that overall information collection tends to decline. Finally, since it
is more difficult to find interested buyers, an illiquid stock is more
costly to turn into cash. As a consequence, the seller of an illiquid
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as uncertainty about the underlying value increases, as less investors
are interested to buy it and as trading becomes more costly, the share
price decreases.
Although there is no perfect agreement yet about how the precise
interaction of the factors in the process described above affects value,
there is consensus in the academic literature that liquidity has an
impact on share prices. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
Reingaum (1990), Eleswarapu and Reingaum (1993), Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan et al. (1998), Eckbo and Norli (2000)
provide evidence that stock market liquidity is priced in asset returns.
Specifically, they show that illiquid shares require higher (pre-trading
cost) returns, which implies a higher cost of equity. In a more direct
test of the consequences of liquidity for value, Loderer and Roth
(2003) report that the least liquid stocks on Nasdaq and the Swiss
Exchange suffer a discount on value of about 30%. Finally, Butler et
al. (2002) show for the U.S. that companies with highly liquid shares
suffer less issuance costs at the time they raise new share capital and
sell these additional shares in the market.
Although research on the exact determinants of liquidity is still
ongoing, there is agreement that the type of investors holding the
firm’s stock may affect it. Specifically, companies that count many
institutional investors among their investor base tend to have more
liquid shares. Of course, institutional investors have a preference for
liquid shares (see for example Gompers and Metrick (1998)). Liquid-
ity, for example, is valuable when they have to rebalance their port-
folios over time. Conversely, as these investors engage in more infor-
mation collection compared to the average retail investor, liquidity is
likely to improve. Supporting this idea, Bennett et al. (2003) report
that when changes in the preferences of institutional investors occur
– e.g., a relative increase in interest for smaller firms in search for
‘greener pastures’ – the liquidity of these companies’ stock rises over
time.
However, trading by institutional investors may also induce other
effects on stock prices and/or the cost of equity. Institutional investors
may reduce the global tax bill paid by the company and its investors
if the former function under a different tax regime. In Belgium, for
example, BEVEKS pay no taxes on dividends, and tax trading by
these mutual funds around the ex-dividend day is a well-known phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, Redding (1997) shows in a theoretical model
699that when professional investors pay relatively few taxes on dividends,
publicly quoted firms generally pay more dividends. As indicated in
Section III.C., higher cash disbursements to investors imply less
opportunities for overspending by management, which may positively
affect the quality of the firm’s governance. On the negative side, it is
sometimes claimed that institutional investors contribute to greater
stock price variability because of the vast amounts of trading when
these investors rebalance their portfolios. That such rebalancing indeed
may have important effects can be easily observed by looking at the
stock prices of firms that are moved in or out of an important stock
market index. As institutional investors commonly have a prefer-
ence for index stocks, inclusion in (deletion from) a stock market
index induces substantial changes in ownership. Shleifer (1986) and
Denis et al. (2003), among others, show that this event significantly
impacts on the company’s stock price. Whether or not institutional
investors actually cause greater stock price variability is as yet not
clear. The empirical findings of Bushee and Noe (2000) indicate that
for the U.S. the presence of these professionals has not much impact
on return volatility. However, some institutional investors – such as
momentum traders and hedge funds5 – tend to trade more aggressively,
and these professionals may induce more volatility. For Poland, Bohl
and Brzeszczynski (2004) document that since the reform of the Pol-
ish pension system in 1999, when privately managed pension funds
were established and allowed to invest in the stock market, institu-
tionals have become a major investor group. Since then, at least for
index stocks, return volatility has decreased. Also, Abarbanell et al.
(2003) find that the rebalancing of institutional portfolios after a firm
spins off a subsidiary does not create abnormal price movements in
the firm’s stock. Similarly, the findings of Welker and Sparks (2001)
indicate a stabilizing trade response by institutional owners at the time
corporations disclose news. However, Potter (1992) and Sias (1996)
provide evidence that higher institutional ownership is associated with
higher stock price volatility. The findings in Badrinath and Wahal
(2002) imply that contribution to (reduction in) volatility depends on
the type of trading decision: to enter a new stock, institutional
investors act as momentum traders, and hence may contribute to
volatility, but when they exit or make adjustments to ongoing holdings,
they behave as contrarian traders. Overall, most research indicates that
institutional investors positively influence liquidity. However, from
the findings it is also clear that further work is needed as the type of
700professional investors and their trading strategies have a diverse
impact on the behavior of stock prices.
C. Institutional investors and corporate governance
Corporate governance concerns the development of performing top
structures in corporate organizations. One of its major elements is the
creation of effective oversight of managers. Legally, shareholders exer-
cise such oversight by voting at the general meeting and electing the
board of directors. The board, being responsible to the shareholders
and to the firm as a whole, has the duty to monitor managers and their
performance. If shareholders such as institutional investors become
dissatisfied with the board and likely also with the firm’s performance,
they have three choices: 1) use the old ‘Wall Street rule’, i.e. simply
sell their shares, 2) hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction,
3) hold their shares and otherwise do nothing. Over the last decades,
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, the question has been raised as
to whether or not institutional shareholders should be assigned a spe-
cial role in corporate governance. The underlying idea is that they are
in a much better position to effectively exercise oversight compared
to small retail investors, given the size of their investments and the
resources at their command.
To improve the quality of corporate oversight, in the Anglo-Saxon
countries much attention has already been devoted to the question of
designing conditions that stimulate institutional investors to exert
shareholder activism, i.e. choose option 2 above. The reason is that as
ownership of publicly quoted firms is dispersed, which is typical in
these countries, management acquires a great deal (too much?) of
power. This is the source of the famous agency problem of equity,
which states that although the management is the agent of the share-
holders, it typically has its own interests that it wishes to pursue.
Hence unless forces of oversight stop this, managers may not spend
the resources of the firm too wisely. Management derives its power
from the fact that over time it builds up a vast information advantage
about the goings-on in the firm relative to outside shareholders,
whereas the latter – especially when being small owners – have no
incentive to expend costs and effort to monitor management or board
functioning. As a result, managers may even acquire an important
degree of influence over the nomination and the functioning of the
board instead of, as intended by the legislator, the board hiring, firing
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holders that may have an incentive to actively engage in corporate
oversight are large owners. The importance of their stake justifies
expending the costly monitoring effort. When the ownership of large
public corporations is relatively widespread, as is the case in the U.S.,
the owners with the most important stakes usually are professional
investors. Hence, the idea to activate institutional investors. To achieve
this goal, in the U.S. these professionals are obliged to be present at
the general meeting and vote. Furthermore, and possibly even more
important, they afterwards have to explain to their stakeholders the
stance they have taken. Obviously, too easy-going behavior by insti-
tutional investors may result in lawsuits from their stakeholders.
By contrast, in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, institutional owners
tend to play a far less prominent role, although, as discussed in Sec-
tion II, worldwide their weight is rising quickly. Furthermore, unlike
the U.S., institutional investors in non-Anglo-Saxon countries are not
pushed by the legal system to actively monitor their portfolio firms.
Hence, it should not come as a surprise that the latter behave more
passively in corporate governance matters. Also, and likely more
important, in these countries, control in publicly quoted firms is typ-
ically concentrated within the hands of a few large blockholders that
usually act in concert. Such blockholders typically consist of wealthy
families, holding firms, large industrial firms, banks or even the gov-
ernment. Their objectives are different from those of the typical insti-
tutional investor. Whereas the latter remains an outsider to the firm
and only strives for diversification within its portfolio, good returns
and liquidity, blockholders wish to become insiders into the firm and
actively exercise control over it. Not surprisingly, the typical owner-
ship stake of institutional investors in a listed firm normally is below
5% (often constrained by law to amount to maximally 3 to 5%), while
the stake of controlling blockholders typically is much higher (usu-
ally above 25%). Furthermore, as a rule, institutional investors do not
sit on boards. By contrast, controlling blockholders in many non-
Anglo-Saxon countries vote themselves or their representatives into
the board and take an active interest in the management of the firm.
As a result, in publicly quoted non-Anglo-Saxon firms, managers hold
far less power as compared to the Anglo-Saxon situation. Although the
presence of such large owners largely solves the agency problem of
equity, a new difficulty arises, viz. the issue of possible conflicts of
interest between large and small owners. Clearly, the way corporate
702governance functions differs between Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-
Saxon countries. Hence, the possible contribution of institutional
investors to it is also likely to have a somewhat different character.
In particular, oversight by large blockholders may substitute for mon-
itoring by institutionals.
Until the late nineties, there was a general satisfaction about the
functioning of the corporate governance system in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, especially in the U.S. One felt that by a combination of stricter
rules about the functioning of the board – to make it more indepen-
dent from management, by appointing outside directors for example
– and by increasing outside pressures through activating the share-
holder base – e.g., force institutional investors to take an active role
as described earlier – one had converged to a situation where on the
one hand management had the leeway to take its responsibilities while
on the other hand there was sufficient oversight. The accounting scan-
dals of the early 2000’s, however, show the limitations of outsiders
(institutional investors and financial markets in general) once they are
pitted against management with its important information advantage
about the internal processes of the firm. Hence, additional measures,
like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which aim at forcing firms to tighten
their internal control systems, have been taken.
Many researchers have attempted to measure the consequences of
institutional shareholder activism. However, measuring its effective-
ness is quite problematic. One of the reasons is that when activism
occurs, usually the firm is not doing well and, as a result, management
is under mounting pressure from different sides. Debtholders, for
example, may take a more active role in monitoring the firm (Lasfer
et al. (1996)). Furthermore, much of the activism occurs behind the
scenes, through private discussions. Not surprisingly, the empirical
evidence – which virtually all concerns the U.S. – on whether insti-
tutional investors contribute to better governance through monitoring
is somewhat mixed, although the majority of the research reports pos-
itive effects. Chung et al. (2002), for example, report that when insti-
tutional investors own a large fraction of outstanding shares, firms
manage their earnings less opportunistically through the use of accru-
als. Another example on the positive role of institutionals in disci-
plining managers in the U.S. is provided by O’Neill and Swisher
(2003). These authors build further on the results of Easley et al.
(2002), who find that as the probability of trading by informed insid-
ers increases, the required rate of return on equity goes up. O’Neill and
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that such informed trading is less likely to occur the higher the num-
ber of institutional investors owning shares in the company. Further-
more, institutional investors seem to influence management in its deci-
sions to use firm resources. As discussed earlier, one of the major
concerns in Anglo-Saxon governance is the possible wasteful spend-
ing of cash flow by managers. Therefore, disgorgement of cash to
shareholders through dividends instead of investing it in unprofitable
projects is considered a plus in the governance literature. Most empir-
ical studies indicate that institutional investors generally are capable
of making a distinction between overspending on uninteresting pro-
jects and making valuable long-term investments. To look into this
issue, several studies have examined the relation between institutional
ownership and the degree of R&D spending. Most studies report that
– contrary to what is often claimed by managers – the presence of
these owners does not force firms to behave myopically. Rather, high
institutional ownership and sizeable R&D spending prove to be pos-
itively correlated (e.g., Wahal and McConnell (2000); Bushee (1998),
among others). However, a few studies conclude the reverse (e.g.,
Jones and Danbolt (2003)). Also, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that
professional investors help to constrain lavish remunerations of top
managers in the U.S. whereas badly managed firms break more eas-
ily with their current managers under the pressure of institutional own-
ers (Parrino et al. (2003)).
On the other hand, Pound (1988) and Brickley et al. (1988), Van
Nuys (1993), Borokhovich et al. (2000), Almazan et al. (2003), among
others, provide theoretical and empirical evidence that instead of mon-
itoring, institutional investors may have an incentive to simply go
along with entrenched managers, and this depending upon current and
prospective business relations between the institution and the firm. As
an example, the money manager of the company’s pension fund is
less likely to act independently vis-à-vis its management as compared
to the money manager of an independent pension fund. In other words,
institutional investors themselves may be confronted with important
conflicts of interest, to the detriment of small retail investors. To sum-
marize, the literature generally indicates that institutional investors
play a positive role in improving governance practices in firms, espe-
cially in the Anglo-Saxon world.7 However, many unknowns remain.
The latter conclusion is even more applicable to non-Anglo-Saxon
countries.
704IV. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND IPOS:
AN APPLICATION TO BELGIUM
Former studies focus on the impact of institutional investors on the
firms in which they own stock. However, firms, understanding the ben-
efits of having institutional investors in their ownership structure, may
undertake efforts to attract them. The fact that company policy may be
an important factor influencing involvement by institutionals has been
shown in Grullon et al. (2004) for the U.S. in the context of actions that
increase firm visibility. We show a similar effect for Belgium in the case
of firms going public. As indicated in the introduction the reason why
we focus on IPOs is that at the time of the event, information asym-
metries generally are large (the firm has not yet built up a public track
record), the liquidity of the firm’s stock has to be assured in order to
establish the firm’s credibility (leave a good taste in the investors’
mouth) and governance structures usually have to be adjusted to take
into account the new (public) ownership structure of the firm. So, when
benefits are larger than costs, firms may wish to attract institutional
interest for their company’s stock. We start by describing our IPO-
sample in Section IV.A. Then, we examine the underlying forces that
drive the decision to pre-allocate shares to institutional investors at IPO-
time (Section IV.B.), linking our research to the different functions of
institutionals as described in Section III. Specifically, we cannot directly
measure the amount IPO-firms expend on attracting institutional
interest. Instead we examine whether or not IPO-firms preallocate a
fraction of shares offered to these investors. Next, we investigate how
share pre-allocation to institutional investors affects underpricing (Sec-
tion IV.C.), post-IPO stock liquidity (Section IV.D.) and the fraction of
outside directors in the board at IPO-time (Section IV.E.).
A. Sample description
Our sample covers the period 1984-2000 and includes all new listings
of Belgian firms on the three main exchanges of the country, i.e. the
main market of the Brussels Stock Exchange (Euronext Brussels),
Euro.NM Belgium and EASDAQ (NASDAQ Europe). Our sample
does not include unit offerings nor reverse LBOs. For all 95 firms in
the sample, we obtained the issue prospectus (containing data on
ownership structure and board composition) and have access to their
consolidated financial statements as of two years before the IPO.
705In addition, we collected data on the first-day closing price and trading
volumes in the two years after the company became publicly quoted.
Figure 1 reveals a concentration of new listings in the periods 1986-
1987 and 1996-2000. Other studies (e.g., Pagano et al. (1998); Aro-
sio et al. (2001)) show that IPO-volume also peaks in other Conti-
nental European countries during these years. As expected, increased
IPO-activity coincides with periods in which the stock market indices
BASI (Euronext) and EASI (EASDAQ) are booming.
Table 1 shows the industry distribution of the 95 sample firms.8
Similar to Arosio et al. (2001) for Italy, financial IPOs are concentrated
in the earlier years of the sampling period, while high-tech flotations
mainly occur during the later years. Despite the creation of new markets,
an important fraction of the high-tech firms continues to opt for the main
market of Euronext. In particular, of the 29 high-tech IPOs since 1996,
14 firms (48.28%) list on the main market, whereas 9 firms (31.03%)
list on EASDAQ and 6 firms (20.69%) quote on Euro-NM Belgium.
Table 2 contains some summary statistics on the IPO-firms. Given
the length of the sampling period and in view of the high inflation
rates during the late eighties and early nineties, all absolute statistics
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FIGURE 1
Number of IPOs versus stock market returns over the period 1984-2000
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Number of IPOs Belgian All Share Index European All Share Indexare corrected for inflation. 61 firms sell primary shares at IPO-time.
In other words, they create new shares and sell these to the general
public at their IPO. Hence, the company receives the proceeds from
the sale. 71 firms offer secondary, i.e. existing shares. This implies
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TABLE 2
Industry distribution of sample firms
NACE Sector Number of 
firms
16 Production and distribution of electricity, gas, steam and 
hot water 1 firm
22 Production and preliminary processing of metals 1 firm
24 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 3 firms
25 Chemical industry 4 firms
31 Manufacture of metal articles (except for mechanical, 
electrical and instrument engineering and vehicles) 1 firm
32 Mechanical engineering 1 firm
34 Electrical engineering 7 firms
41/42 Food, drink and tobacco industry 9 firms
43 Textile industry 2 firms
45 Footwear and clothing industry 2 firms
46 Timber and wooden furniture industry 1 firm
47 Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and 
publishing 3 firms
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 3 firms
61 Wholesale distribution (except dealing in scrap and 
waste materials) 5 firms
64/65 Retail distribution 2 firms
66 Hotels and catering 3 firms
75 Air transport 1 firm
79 Communication 1 firm
81 Banking and finance 14 firms
82 Insurance, except for compulsory social insurance 3 firms
83 Activities auxiliary to banking and finance and 
insurance; business services 20 firms
84 Renting, leasing and hiring of movables 1 firm
85 Letting of real estate by the owner 2 firms
97 Recreational services and other cultural services 5 firms
TOTAL 95 FIRMSthat existing shareholders who sell some of their own shares receive
the proceeds. In our sample, 34 offerings combine primary and sec-
ondary shares. The median primary and secondary portion equals
10.50%, respectively 15%. In total, the free float amounts to 25.79%
of shares outstanding post-IPO. 38 firms pre-allocate shares to insti-
tutional investors at IPO-time, i.e. pre-assign a portion of the shares
for sale to professional investors. Pre-assigning became increasingly
popular during the second half of the nineties, with the spreading use
of bookbuilding. Since the beginning of 1996, about 60% of IPOs
opted for the bookbuilding procedure; before that time, it was rarely
used. Table 3 shows that on average, 24.68% of offered shares are
pre-allocated to institutional investors, but the dispersion in this vari-
able is substantial. For the firms with institutional pre-allocation, this
percentage on average amounts to 60.12%.9 Median underpricing,
after correcting for the market return, equals 5.31%. This figure is
rather low compared to the underpricing reported for many other coun-
tries (e.g., Ritter (1991); Leleux (1993); Arosio et al. (2001)), but may
reflect that a large majority of the sample IPOs are firm-commitment
offerings (e.g., Jegadeesh et al. (1993)).10
Firm age at flotation varies between zero and 283 years, with a
median of 18 years. Firm size in the year preceding the IPO is also
dispersed, independent of the construct used to measure it (total assets,
book value of equity or sales). The median firm has a return on assets
of 14.52% and a return on sales of 12.06%, but profitability again dif-
fers widely across firms. Companies are highly levered: on average,
67.16% of total assets are debt-financed, and bank loans represent
42.53% of total debt (bank debt, leasing and current liabilities).
Despite high leverage, an average coverage ratio of 22.05 indicates
that firms can easily meet their debt obligations; the median coverage
ratio, however, is much lower (3.09). As some firms have a leverage
ratio above one and/or a negative coverage ratio, it can be concluded
that not all firms are financially sound at IPO-time. The average mar-
ket-to-book ratio, calculated using the offering price, is 3.94. The
growth rate in total assets and sales amounts to 28.22%, respectively
21.43% in the pre-IPO year; these growth rates however vary sub-
stantially across firms.
Ownership before and after the IPO is highly concentrated. On
average, there are 2.46 blockholders per firm; together, they own
93.31% of the shares before the IPO. Afterwards, their number and





Summary statistics for the total sample of N = 95 IPOs
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
IPO TRANSACTION
PRIMARY PORTION 0.3004 0.1050 0.7790 0 6.7568
SECONDARY PORTION 0.1704 0.1500 0.1658 0 1
PERCENTAGE PLACED 0.3080 0.2579 0.1629 0.0587 1
INSTITUTIONAL STAKE 0.2468 0 0.3089 0 0.9133
UNDERPRICING 0.1395 0.0531 0.3429 –0.2153 2.7769
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
AGE 39.4421 18 53.2401 0 283
TOTAL ASSETS (/) 1,348,613,382 44,407,221 9,575,200,000 422,260 92,360,483,771
EQUITY (/) 106,708,008 11,548,860 306,170,000 –2,597,647 1,783,888,453
SALES (/) 281,596,118 44,588,670 919,420,000 0 6,194,926,469
ROA (EBITD/total assets) 0.1235 0.1452 0.2103 –0.7205 1.1063
ROS (EBITD/sales) –0.0079 0.1206 0.6423 –3.5983 1
LEVERAGE (debt/total assets) 0.6716 0.7256 0.3421 0.0319 2.8262
DEBT MIX (bank debt/total debt) 0.4253 0.4186 0.2923 0 1
INTEREST COVERAGE 
(interestexpenses/EBIT) 22.0540 3.0875 78.4790 –31.8377 461.3582
MARKET/BOOK 3.9366 1.8992 0.7403 17.9444 4.8245
ASSETS GROWTH 0.5330 0.2822 0.7407 –0.1541 3.5668
SALES GROWTH 5.1747 0.2143 36.2668 –0.7128 336.44447
1
0 Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
BLOCKHOLDERS BEFORE IPO 2.46 2 1.4718 1 7
BLOCKHOLDERS AFTER IPO 1.99 2 1.1439 1 5
CONC BEFORE IPO (%) 93.31 98.61 11.3780 33.43 100.00
CONC AFTER IPO (%) 64.94 69.10 15.9887 11.85 94.13
PRIMARY (SECONDARY) PORTION is the ratio of new (existing) shares sold to the public relative to shares outstanding before the
IPO. PERCENTAGE PLACED is the number of new and existing shares sold at the IPO relative to shares outstanding after the IPO.
INSTITUTIONAL is the percentage of shares that is pre-allocated to institutional investors. UNDERPRICING is initial stock return
minus the corresponding market return. The variables measuring firm characteristics are self-contained. BLOCKHOLDERS BEFORE
IPO is the number of shareholders whose ownership exceeds 5%. BLOCKHOLDERS AFTER IPO equals the number of initial block-
holders that retain an ownership percentage above 5% after the IPO. CONC measures the percentage of shares initial blockholders
hold before, respectively after the IPO.cases, initial ownership decreases below 50 percent, but this does not
need to imply that initial owners lose control once listed. Similar
results have been found for Italy (Pagano et al. (1998)), Germany
(Ljungqvist (1997); Goergen (1998)) and other Continental European
countries.
B. Determinants of pre-allocating shares to institutional investors
In Section III, we have argued that firms with large information asym-
metries, firms in need of liquidity and/or firms with less developed
governance structures may benefit from having institutional investors
in their ownership. To test whether or not firms actually seek to reduce
the costs of asymmetric information, low liquidity and poor corporate
oversight, we estimate a regression model that explains the likelihood
of pre-allocating shares to institutional investors at IPO-time. Such
pre-allocation increases the transparency of the IPO-procedure, guar-
antees institutionals at least a minimal stake11 and hence, gives them
incentives to gather information. Possibly, it may also enhance their
long-run ownership in the firm. The dependent variable in our logit
regression model, INSTITUTIONAL, is a dummy variable that equals
one when a fraction of the offering is pre-allocated to institutional
investors and zero otherwise. Hereafter, we first describe our mea-
surement of explanatory variables and then discuss our results, which
are presented in Table 4.
To examine the relation between information asymmetries at IPO-
time and INSTITUTIONAL, we use three variables. First, several
authors (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991); Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1999)) find adverse selection costs to be more serious for young
(AGE = logarithm of the firm’s age at IPO-time) and small (SIZE =
logarithm of total assets) companies. The reason is that younger and
smaller firms typically have a limited track record and low visibility.
In addition, firms with large growth opportunities (MARKET/BOOK
= number of shares outstanding pre-IPO times the offering price plus
book value of debt divided by book value of total assets pre-IPO) also
may suffer from severe information problems. For growth opportuni-
ties represent investment projects that still have to be converted into
cash generation. So, the quality of growth opportunities is uncertain
and, as argued in Section III.A., firms may find it difficult to com-
municate that quality. To control for the fact that in carve-outs, infor-
mation asymmetries likely are less severe, we include a dummy
711variable (CARVEOUT = dummy variable that is set to one when the
offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise).
Second, growth firms planning to use the exchange as a source of
future financing can benefit from institutional interest through an
increase in stock liquidity. Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2002) find
that firms selling primary shares at IPO-time (PRIMARY = dummy
variable equal to one when primary shares are sold at the IPO and
zero otherwise) are more likely to raise additional equity in the after-
market. Conversely, firms that do not intend to tap the stock market
in the future gain far less from institutional interest and may even dis-
like the monitoring by these professionals (e.g., Brennan and Franks
(1997)).
Third, to capture the quality of a company’s governance, we include
two variables in our regression model. First, Jensen (1986) claims that
firms with higher debt ratios (LEVERAGE = total debt to total assets)
have a smaller need for capital market disciplining as leverage forces
them to regularly pay out free cash flows to meet debt-servicing pay-
ments. Second, as argued in Section III.C., firms that have large block-
holders among their shareholder base (CONC AFTER IPO = the per-
centage of shares initial blockholders retain after the IPO) are less
likely to need monitoring by institutional investors. Finally, we include
industry dummy variables using the classification by Ritter (1991);
the parameter estimates corresponding to these dummy variables are
not reported, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
The results in Table 4 show that the relation between information
asymmetries and the likelihood of pre-allocation is not unambiguous.
While we do find that carve-outs are significantly less likely to pre-
allocate shares to institutional investors, we also find that larger firms
are more likely to pre-allocate, which is inconsistent with our hypothe-
ses. In addition, the variables AGE and MARKET/BOOK are not sig-
nificant in explaining the pre-allocation decision. These inconclusive
results may reflect that, as argued in Section III.A., institutional
investors not only help to reduce information asymmetries, but gen-
erally also wish to invest in firms that face low information problems.
The positive relation with firm size may also reveal that firms need
to have a minimal size in order for institutional investors to become
interested in the company. Simultaneously, the positive and signifi-
cant coefficient for SIZE could indicate that larger, hence most of the
time also better-known firms attract more investors and institutionals
in particular, as argued in Section III.A.
712Consistent with our hypotheses, firms raising new equity at IPO-
time are significantly more likely to pre-allocate shares to institutional
investors. This finding suggests that firms using the exchange as a
source of future financing can benefit greatly from the presence of
professional investors, who reduce information asymmetries and help
to establish stock liquidity. These actions reduce the cost of seasoned
equity offerings and thus the cost of capital. Huyghebaert and Van
Hulle (2002) even find that these firms position themselves to meet
the requirements of an international investor audience. They show that
firms create the conditions such that a liquid market in their shares can
develop. Particularly, firms with a small portion of primary shares
complement their offering with secondary shares to realize a suffi-
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The dependent (dummy) variable INSTITUTIONAL equals one when a fraction
of the shares is pre-allocated to institutional investors at IPO-time and zero oth-
erwise. AGE (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of firm age at the IPO (total
assets post-IPO). Growth opportunities at IPO-time are measured by the firm’s
market-to-book ratio (MARKET/BOOK). CARVEOUT is a dummy variable that
is set to one when the offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE
is debt to total assets. PRIMARY is a dummy variable that equals one when pri-
mary shares are sold at IPO-time and zero otherwise. CONC AFTER IPO mea-
sures the percentage of shares initial blockholders retain after the IPO.Finally, we find some support for our conjecture that firms with
less developed governance structures may benefit from having pro-
fessionals among their shareholder base. On the one hand, the relation
between LEVERAGE and INSTITUTIONAL has the expected nega-
tive sign, but is not significant. On the other hand, firms where a larger
fraction of outstanding shares is concentrated in the hands of block-
holders are less likely to pre-allocate shares to institutionals. The lat-
ter finding suggests that, as argued in Section III.C., in Continental
Europe, blockholder monitoring can substitute for institutional moni-
toring.
C. Impact of institutional investors on underpricing
In this section, we investigate whether pre-allocating shares to insti-
tutional investors at IPO-time helps to reduce information asymme-
tries. Specifically, we examine its impact on IPO-underpricing, which
is defined as the percentage difference between the first-day closing
price and the offering price, corrected for the stock market return
(BASI) of that day. Consistent with our discussion in Section III.A.,
we also include a dummy variable that equals one when bookbuild-
ing was used to market the shares and zero otherwise (BOOK-
BUILDING) in this model. In addition, we control for the fact that
firms planning to use the stock market as a source of future financing
may have an incentive the underprice the issue in order to leave a
good taste in the investors’ mouths (PRIMARY). As in Garfinkel
(1993), Spiess and Pettway (1997), among others, we control for addi-
tional factors that are related to IPO-underpricing: firm age, firm size,
investment opportunities (MARKET/BOOK), whether or not the IPO
is a carve-out, a dummy variable that equals one when a high-reputa-
tion foreign investment bank is part of the underwriting committee
(FOREIGN BANK), the percentage adjustment in the offering price
relative to the mid-price of the initial price range (ADJ.PRICE), the
historical stock market return (MARKET RETURN = the return on the
Belgian All Shares Index (BASI) in the year preceding the IPO) and
a measure for hot versus cold issue markets (VOLUME = the num-
ber of IPOs in the preceding year scaled by the total number of IPOs
in the sample). Table 5 contains the results.
We find some evidence that firms pre-allocating shares to institu-
tional investors underprice their shares to a smaller extent, even though
the variable INSTITUTIONAL is only marginally significant at the
71410% level (p-value of 0.1040). This finding is consistent with the idea
that involving institutional investors in the pricing process through
pre-allocating a fraction of the offering induces these investors to
invest in information collection and truthfully reveal their opinion.
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TABLE 5
OLS regression results: determinants of underpricing









FOREIGN BANK –0.2161 0.0106
ADJ.PRICE 0.9318 0.0122
MARKET RETURN 0.3514 0.0316
VOLUME 2.2340 0.0015
Number of observations 93
Adjusted R2+ 25.59%
The dependent variable UNDERPRICING is the percentage difference between
the first-day closing price and the offering price, corrected for the stock market
return (BASI) of that day. INSTITUTIONAL is a dummy variable that equals one
when a fraction of the shares is pre-allocated to institutional investors at IPO-time
and zero otherwise. BOOKBUILDING is a dummy variable that equals one when
bookbuilding was used to market the shares and zero otherwise. PRIMARY is a
dummy variable that equals one when primary shares are sold at IPO-time and
zero otherwise. AGE (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of firm age (total
assets) at the IPO. Growth opportunities at IPO-time are measured by the firm’s
market-to-book ratio (MARKET/BOOK). CARVEOUT is a dummy variable that
is set to one when the offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise. FOREIGN
BANK is a dummy variable that equals one when a high-reputation foreign
investment bank is part of the underwriting committee. ADJ.PRICE is the per-
centage adjustment in the offering price measured relative to the mid-price of
the initial price range. MARKET RETURN is the stock market return (BASI)
during the twelve months pre-IPO whereas VOLUME is the number of IPOs in
that same period scaled by the total number of IPOs in the sample.Surprisingly, the results show that using bookbuilding generally leads
to higher underpricing, ceteris paribus. The positive sign of BOOK-
BUILDING is inconsistent with the results of other studies that largely
use data on U.S. IPOs (e.g., Cornelli and Goldreich (2001); Aggarwal
et al. (2002); Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002)). While we have hinted
at possible conflicts of interest between firms going public and their
investment bankers in Continental Europe, we believe that further
research is needed to examine the driving forces behind the positive
relation in our study. The hypothesis that firms likely to tap the stock
market in the future may have an incentive to underprice their offer-
ing to a larger extent is not supported by our model.
While firm size and the dummy for the IPO being a carve-out do
not explain IPO-underpricing, we find that all other variables are sta-
tistically significant, with the expected sign. In particular, we find that
younger firms with more investment opportunities realize higher first-
day returns, ceteris paribus. When a high-reputation foreign invest-
ment bank is part of the underwriting committee, IPOs are underpriced
to a smaller extent. A larger percentage adjustment of the final offer-
ing price relative to the mid-price of the initial price range, which in
the literature is considered to capture the uncertainty in determining
the final price, is associated with higher IPO-underpricing. Finally,
when the historical stock market return is large or the IPO takes place
in a hot issue market, offerings are underpriced more. Interestingly,
when the latter two variables are removed from the model, its explana-
tory power reduces drastically: the adjusted R2 drops from 25.59% to
16.08%. Overall, these results thus stress the importance of market
conditions in explaining IPO-underpricing.
D. Impact of institutional investors on stock liquidity
In this section, we wish to investigate whether post-IPO liquidity is
higher in firms that pre-allocated a fraction of their offering to insti-
tutional investors at IPO-time. Post-IPO stock liquidity is hereby
defined as the number of shares traded during a horizon of one, respec-
tively two years starting one month after the IPO divided by the num-
ber of shares outstanding after the IPO (see also Eckbo and Norli,
2000). The first post-IPO month is disregarded to correct for the fact
that early liquidity may be affected by the adopted distribution rules.
To test our main hypothesis, we investigate the relation between
INSTITUTIONAL and post-IPO liquidity. In addition, we include the
716variable PRIMARY, which is highly related to INSTITUTIONAL,
to control for the fact that firms planning to use the stock market as
a financing vehicle structure their IPO also in other ways such that a
liquid market in their shares can develop (e.g., Huyghebaert and Van
Hulle (2002)). To control for firm age and size, the log of firm age at
the IPO, respectively total assets post-IPO are included. As in Bren-
nan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Chordia et al. (2001) and others, we
control for additional factors that may affect stock liquidity: invest-
ment opportunities (MARKET/BOOK), a dummy that equals one
when the firm lists on a market for innovative growth companies, i.e.
EASDAQ or Euro.NM Belgium (MARKET TYPE), a dummy that
equals one when at least one market maker is appointed (MARKET
MAKER), the historical stock market return (MARKET RETURN)
and a measure for hot versus cold issue markets (VOLUME). Finally,
we include industry dummy variables using Ritter’s (1991) classifi-
cation. The results are presented in Table 6.
We find that INSTITUTIONAL is significantly positively related to
post-IPO liquidity, independent of the time horizon considered. So,
pre-allocating shares to institutional investors significantly positively
affects a stock’s liquidity. This relation confirms the idea that firms
may have incentives to involve institutional investors in their owner-
ship so as to help establish liquidity. While firms may also use other
mechanisms to develop a liquid market in their shares, we find that
PRIMARY is not significantly related to post-IPO liquidity. This find-
ing stresses that pre-allocation to institutional investors is the main
channel through which firms planning to use the exchange as a financ-
ing vehicle assure the liquidity of their stock. Firm age, firm size and
investment opportunities, as captured by the market-to-book ratio, are
not significant.
However, we do find evidence of different levels of stock liquidity
depending upon the exchange on which the firm lists. In particular,
EASDAQ and Euro.NM Belgium, which were established for listing
innovative growth companies, have more depth, ceteris paribus.
Hence, as pointed out by Corwin and Harris (2001), the selection of
the appropriate stock market is an important consideration for IPO-
candidates. Appointing a market maker also significantly increases
liquidity, especially over longer horizons. The latter result is not sur-
prising as the task of a market maker mainly consists of guaranteeing
market liquidity. Historical stock market performance affects post-IPO
liquidity positively. Also, there is some evidence of reduced liquidity
717following periods of high IPO-volume, especially during the two-year
window. Finally, a comparison of the adjusted R2 of the models in
Table 6 indicates that it is easier to explain liquidity over the longer
horizon. The reason may be that the trade of shares in the first post-




determinants of one- and two-year post-IPO stock liquidity
One-year liquidity Two-year liquidity
Variable Parameter p-value Parameter p-value
estimate estimate
Intercept 0.6964 0.0738 –0.0443 0.8474
INSTITUTIONAL 0.2052 0.0222 0.1574 0.0023
PRIMARY –0.0002 0.9984 –0.0088 0.8381
AGE –0.0241 0.3926 0.0142 0.3633
SIZE (post-IPO) –0.0204 0.2262 0.0062 0.5230
MARKET/BOOK 0.0124 0.1779 0.0057 0.2844
MARKET TYPE 0.1984 0.1163 0.1730 0.0166
MARKET MAKER 0.0756 0.3789 0.0948 0.0621
MARKET RETURN 0.4688 0.0077 0.2182 0.0303
VOLUME –0.9621 0.1763 –1.4741 0.0003
Number of observations 92 77
Adjusted R2 37.09% 52.00%
The dependent variable ONE-(TWO-)YEAR LIQUIDITY in column one (two)
is the number of shares traded over a window of one (two) year(s) following the
IPO divided by the number of shares outstanding post-IPO. INSTITUTIONAL
is a dummy variable that equals one when a fraction of the shares is pre-allocated
to institutional investors at IPO-time and zero otherwise. PRIMARY is a dummy
variable that equals one when primary shares are sold at IPO-time and zero oth-
erwise. AGE (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of firm age at the IPO (total
assets post-IPO). Growth opportunities at IPO-time are measured by the firm’s
market-to-book ratio (MARKET/BOOK). MARKET TYPE is equal to one if the
firm lists on a market for innovative growth firms and zero otherwise. MAR-
KET MAKER equals one if at least one market maker is appointed and is zero
otherwise. MARKET RETURN is the stock market return (BASI) during the
twelve months pre-IPO whereas VOLUME is the number of IPOs in that same
period scaled by the total number of IPOs in the sample.distribution rules or support activities by the investment banker, which
fade out over time.
E. Impact of institutional investors on board composition
Finally, we investigate whether or not pre-allocation to institutional
investors affects the number of independent directors on the IPO-
firm’s board. Specifically, in Belgium much of the governance debate
during our sampling period was centered on increasing the number of
outside directors on boards. Attenuating conflicts of interest between
controlling blockholders and small shareholders was considered to be
a major part of their task. Consequently we check whether or not com-
panies that involve institutionals in their ownership at IPO-time also
have more independent directors on their boards, ceteris paribus.
Hence, the dependent variable in this section is the number of outside
directors relative to the total number of directors at IPO-time (variable
BOARD COMPOSITION). In addition to the variable INSTITU-
TIONAL, we include our variable capturing whether or not firms
intend to use the stock market as a source of future financing (PRI-
MARY), firm age, firm size (measured post-IPO), growth opportuni-
ties, the dummy for carve-outs, the firm’s debt ratio (post-IPO) and the
percentage initial blockholders retain after the IPO (CONC AFTER
IPO). Table 7 contains the results.
Firms that pre-allocate a fraction of their offering to institutional
investors have a significantly lower fraction of outside directors. This
finding is surprising when taking into account that institutional
investors, who usually do not sit on boards, likely prefer outside direc-
tors to make sure that blockholders do not expropriate small minority
shareholders. Yet, our finding could indicate that the information pro-
duced at the time of the IPO by pre-allocating shares to institutional
investors has significantly reduced information asymmetries (which
is indeed supported by the lower underpricing) such that the need for
independent monitoring at (and shortly after) the IPO is less urgent.
In that case, institutional information production may be considered
as a substitute for outside directors. Earlier, in Section IV.B., we
already found that ownership concentration and institutional involve-
ment could be substitutes. Clearly, although our model only consid-
ers a limited aspect of the interaction between institutional ownership
and governance structure, it indicates that this relation is intricate,
which offers scope for additional research.
719Next, we find that firms likely to use the stock market as a financ-
ing vehicle have a larger fraction of outside directors, ceteris paribus.
Consistent with earlier findings that these firms try to meet the require-
ments of an international investor audience by guaranteeing a mini-
mum free float, involving outside directors in their board is likely to
improve their standing. The latter is particularly important when they
are compared to their (high-tech) peers in stock markets worldwide.
Indeed, as argued in Section III.A., over time IPO-firms have suc-
ceeded in also placing a fraction of their shares with Anglo-Saxon
institutional investors. Next, larger firms and carve-outs have a smaller
fraction of outside directors. The negative sign for SIZE is consistent
with the findings of Van Der Elst (2002), who concludes that large
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TABLE 7
OLS regression results: determinants of board composition





SIZE (post-IPO) –0.0339 0.0050
MARKET/BOOK –0.0028 0.6744
CARVEOUT –0.1053 0.0878
LEVERAGE (post-IPO) 0.0750 0.4479
CONC AFTER IPO 0.5523 0.0107
Number of observations 92
Adjusted R2 28.43%
The dependent variable BOARD COMPOSITION is the number of outside direc-
tors relative to the total number of directors at IPO-time. INSTITUTIONAL is a
dummy variable that equals one when a fraction of the shares is pre-allocated to
institutional investors at IPO-time and zero otherwise. PRIMARY is a dummy
variable that equals one when primary shares are sold at IPO-time and zero oth-
erwise. AGE (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of firm age at the IPO (total
assets post-IPO). Growth opportunities at IPO-time are measured by the firm’s
market-to-book ratio (MARKET/BOOK). CARVEOUT is a dummy variable that
is set to one when the offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE
is debt to total assets post-IPO. CONC AFTER IPO measures the percentage of
shares initial blockholders retain after the IPO.listed companies in Belgium have a larger number of executive board
members relative to total board size. Finally, the variable capturing
blockholder ownership has a significantly positive impact on the frac-
tion of outside directors. Apparently, when control is centered in the
hands of a limited number of blockholders, the latter may wish to con-
vince the stock market that they will not expropriate minority share-
holders by appointing a larger fraction of outside directors. Alterna-
tively, as the number of different blockholders – each wishing to have
its own representative(s) on the board – decreases, there may be more
room for outside directors.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers the question whether or not institutional investors
have a role different from that of other owners in publicly quoted
firms, like controlling blockholders or small private investors. An
overview of the literature shows that institutionals indeed may take up
such a special place. In fact, previous research indicates that the lat-
ter investors play a positive role in decreasing harmful information
asymmetries, thereby offering firms opportunities to decrease their cost
of capital. Similarly, these investors, although they require liquidity,
also contribute to it. In turn, this limits the illiquidity discount on share
value. Finally, compared to small retail investors, professionals have
large amounts of money to invest and more resources available to
monitor company decision making and performance. Consequently,
institutional investors are also in a good position to contribute to the
quality of corporate oversight, i.e. governance in listed firms.
After reviewing the literature on institutional investors, we exam-
ine for Belgium whether or not these professionals indeed play the
roles attributed to them by academic research. To that end, we inves-
tigate the possible impact of these investors on the IPO-process. IPOs
are particularly interesting for this kind of research. The reason is that
at the time of the event information asymmetries are generally large,
the liquidity of the firm’s stock still has to be established and gover-
nance structures often need adjustment. If IPO-companies recognize
the possible beneficial impact of institutional investors on reducing
information problems, increasing liquidity and improving governance,
they may do efforts to attract them. In view of the limited data avail-
ability on the latter issue, we cannot directly measure the amount of
721effort IPO-firms spend on establishing an institutional shareholder
base. Rather, we examine whether or not IPO-firms assign these
professionals an important role in the offering process by checking
whether or not they pre-allocate a fraction of their shares to institu-
tionals at IPO-time.
Controlling for other effects, we find that companies using the stock
market as a financing vehicle are more likely to pre-allocate shares to
institutional investors. Furthermore, pre-allocation tends to be associ-
ated with less underpricing while stock liquidity in the years after the
IPO is significantly larger. These findings indicate that institutional
investors indeed help to decrease information problems, contribute to
liquidity, and that mainly firms that can gain most from these advan-
tages, i.e. companies planning to actively tap the stock market in the
future, seek to attract institutional investors in their ownership structure.
With respect to the contribution of institutionals to corporate gov-
ernance, the evidence is less clear. On the one hand, firms less likely
to be monitored by corporate blockholders are more likely to pre-allo-
cate shares to institutionals at IPO-time. On the other hand, compa-
nies that pre-allocate shares to institutional investors have a signifi-
cantly lower fraction of outside directors in their board. In view of the
fact that, at least when compared to the U.S., in Belgium (and other
Continental European countries) these investors play a less active role
in corporate oversight, our inconclusive findings are not surprising.
Notwithstanding the limited scope of our research on this topic, the
data reveal that interesting interactions exist between ownership con-
centration, the relative number of independent directors and firms
wishing to attract institutional investors.
NOTES
1. An IPO is a transaction whereby private firms become publicly quoted by selling part
of their shares to the public at large.
2. Especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, it has become popular to rank firms based on the
quality of their information disclosure. Typically, such rankings include an evaluation
of the quality, completeness and clarity of the annual report, the timeliness and com-
pleteness of intermediate news reports, the effort spend by the firm on organizing
meetings with financial analysts and institutional investors, etc.
3. These two stages can occur sequentially (in the U.S., for example) or simultaneously,
which is often the case in Belgium. In the latter case, retail investors do not know at
what price they will buy shares; they only know that the price will be in a pre-deter-
mined price range. In case the price that institutional investors are willing to pay
exceeds the maximum of this price range, retail investors are allowed to cancel their
bids.
7224. Alternative explanations have been put forward in the literature to explain IPO under-
pricing. For an overview of the main theories explaining underpricing, see Jenkinson
and Ljungqvist (2000).
5. A hedge fund is a fund that is allowed to use aggressive trading strategies that are
unavailable to mutual funds, including short selling, leverage, program trading, swaps,
arbitrage, and derivatives. Hedge funds are exempt from many of the rules and regu-
lations governing other mutual funds, which allows them to accomplish aggressive
investing goals.
6. A self-tender offer is a transaction whereby the company tenders for its own shares,
i.e. a stock repurchase.
7. For a recent overview of the literature on institutional investors and corporate gover-
nance, see Gillian and Starks (2003).
8. As in Pagano et al. (1998), holding companies that concentrate 75% of their assets in
a single industrial company are reclassified as belonging to the corresponding indus-
trial sector. Financial firms are kept in the sample as in Belgium, and many other
European countries, these firms represent a relatively important subgroup. However,
as financial firms may differ from the other sample firms, we have tested the robust-
ness of our results by removing them from the sample. These results, which show that
our conclusions are unaffected, can be obtained upon request.
9. For the 40 firms on which we have effective share allocation data, we find that on aver-
age 49.43% (median of 58.68%) of the shares placed in public are owned by institu-
tional investors.
10. Firm-commitment IPOs are transactions where the investment banker guarantees the
issuing firm that it will purchase all shares of the offering that remain unsold at a
price as determined in the firm-commitment contract.
11. IPO-allocation mechanisms in Belgium also regularly include a ‘claw back’ clause.
This implies that if the offering is highly successful in attracting small retail investors,
the portion of shares allocated to the latter may increase to the detriment of institu-
tionals.
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